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THE McCARRAN-FERGUSON CONTROVERSY:
SHOULD PROBLEMS IN STATE REGULATORY
DEPARTMENTS TRIGGER FEDERAL REFORM?
INTRODUCTION
Regulation of the insurance industry has been a controversial subject
in the United States for many years.' One issue currently under discussion
is the suitability of the McCarran-Ferguson Act 2 to today's insurance
industry.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted in 1945 to promote state
regulation of the insurance industry at a time when it was uncertain
whether states had the right to regulate and tax the insurance business.
To accomplish this objective, the Act provides that the insurance industry
is subject to federal antitrust laws only to the extent the industry is not
regulated by the states.3 Federal antitrust immunity is, therefore, implied
from the Act's primary promotion of state, regulation and supplemental
dependence on federal law. Because all of the states immediately enacted

1.

2.
3.

Scholars offer various rationales for regulating the insurance industry, but the primary concern
is the need to preserve the stability and solvency of insurers. See Anderson, Insurance and
Antitrust Law: The McCarran-FergusonAct and Beyond, 25 WM. & MtR L. REv. 81, 83 n.7
(1983); R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW-BASIC TEXT § 8.3, at 554-55 (1971); Kimball & Boyce,
The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-FergusonAct in Historical
Perspective, 56 MicH. L. Rav. 545, 546 (1958).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982) [hereinafter cited as McCarran-Ferguson Act].
The Act provides, in pertinent part:
[1.] Congress declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States
of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of
the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation
of such business by the several States.
[2.] (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject
to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business. (b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,
or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates
to the business of insurance: Provided, That after June 30, 1948 .... the Sherman Act,
and . . . the Clayton Act, and ... the Federal Trade Commission Act ... shall be

applicable to the business of insurance to the extent such.business is not regulated by
State law.
[3.] (a) Until June 30, 1948 ... the Sherman Act, and .. . the Clayton Act, and . . .
the Federal Trade Commission Act, and . . .the Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination
Act, shall not apply to the business of insurance or to acts in the conduct thereof. (b)
Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any
agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.
[4.] Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to affect in any manner the
application of the business of insurance of the .. . National Labor Relations Act, or
.. .the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, or ... the Merchant Marine Act, 1920.
McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 10111015 (1982)) (emphasis in original).
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regulatory legislation, 4 the insurance industry has been effectively immune
from federal antitrust laws. 5
The McCarran-Ferguson Act recently has been the subject of intensive
study to determine how its provisions might be contributing to the nation's
insurance crisis. A major study conducted during the Ford Administration
by a Justice Department task force favored a dual system of regulation,6
which would enable insurers to opt between a state or federal charter.
Another study was conducted by the Carter Commission on Antitrust
Laws and Procedures. 7 The Carter Commission recommended the repeal
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Finally, in 1981, the General Accounting
Office reviewed the effectiveness of state insurance regulation and suggested that federal regulation might be preferable to the existing scheme.'
These studies reflect the increasing concern regarding the suitability of
McCarran-Ferguson. Although the Act has remained free from legislative
alteration thus far, 9 it has been the target of many recent proposals for
reform.10
This section will examine the McCarran-Ferguson corftroversy. It will
outline the events that led to the enactment of the Act and show that
McCarran-Ferguson's effect on the insurance industry is contrary to the

4.

In response to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, all states had adopted fire and casualty rating laws
by 1951. Generally, these statutes were patterned after a model law developed by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners. This model law required prior approval of insurance
rates by state officials.
Today, there are two methods of regulating insurance industry rates in the states. Seventeen
states adhere to an open-rating or open-competition system, in which rates are set by insurers
without prior approval of state insurance commissioners. The other 33 states use a regulatory
system called prior approval. In a prior approval jurisdiction, insurers must get approval of
rates from state insurance commissioners through the process of formal hearings. See CoMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
IssUEs AND NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS IN STATE REGULATION OF THE INSURANCE BUSINESS 213-16

5.

6.

(1979) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT]; Sudden Riches for the Casualty Insurers, Bus. WEEK,
May 1, 1978, at 66.
The antitrust exemption is not complete, however. Even if insurer activity is within the "business
of insurance" and state law effectively regulates it, the activity is not outside the purview of
the Sherman Act if it entails a boycott, coercion or intimidation. McCarran-Ferguson Act, supra
note 2, § 3(b).
UNITED

STATES

DEPARTMENT

OF

JUSTICE,

A

REPORT

TO

THE TASK

GROUP ON

ANTITRUST

IMMUNITIEs: THE PRICING AND MARKETING OF INSURANCE 359-72 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
7.

8.
9.
10.

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REPORT].
NATIONAL COMIhSSION ON ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES 225 (1979)

[hereinafter cited as CARTER COMIbSSION REPORT].
It should be noted that the GAO Report made no solid recommendations and characterized its
own findings as being preliminary and inconclusive. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at viii.
A number of changes in the Act's allocation of power have resulted from judicial interpretation.
See Kimball & Heaney, Emasculation of the McCarran-Ferguson Act: A Study in Judicial
Activism, 1985 UTAH L. REv. 1 (1985).
On Jan. 6, 1987, Sen. Metzenbaum introduced S. 80, which calls for repeal of the McCarranFerguson Act. A number of other bills calling for repeal or reform of McCarran-Ferguson have
been introduced in Congress: H.R. 1860, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 1861, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess.; H.R. 1862, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 1863, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 1864, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 1865, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 2635, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R.
4500, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 4501, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 4502, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.;
H.R. 4503, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 4504, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 5713, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess.; S. 2458, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.; S. 2848, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
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Act's intended purpose. The section then will show how regulation of the
insurance industry by the states, regardless of quality or comprehensiveness, enables insurance companies to engage in collective activities, free
of interference from federal antitrust laws. Finally, this section will show
how developments in the law may allow insurance companies to engage
in collective activities, even without the implied grant of immunity in the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE REGULATION OF THE
INSURANCE INDUSTRY
From its beginning, the insurance business has been regarded as a
local matter, to be regulated by the states. In 1868, the Supreme Court
ruled in Paul v. Virginia" that an insurance contract did not constitute
"commerce" within the meaning of the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.12 This placed the insurance industry outside the federal
government's regulatory powers. As a result, regulation of the industry
3
was left to the states.
In 1944, the Supreme Court reversed precedent and ruled in United
States v. South-Eastern UnderwritersAssociation 4 that interstate insurance
transactions constituted interstate commerce and were subject to federal
antitrust laws.' 5 This decision distressed insurance industry officials 6 and
many state regulators, who thought the insurance industry would inevitably
become subject to federal regulation. 7 State regulators feared that many
state controls over insurance companies might be invalidated as undue

11.
12.

13.

14.
15.
16.

17.

75 U.S. 168 (1868).
Id. at 173. A number of Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Paul v. Virginia have affirmed
this principle: Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U.S. 410 (1871); Nutting v. Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 553
(1902); Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U.S. 132 (1918); Colgate v. Harvey,
296 U.S. 404 (1935).
State regulation usually entailed rate regulatory statutes, which authorized the formation of
private rating bureaus. Generally, these rating bureaus operated under the supervision of the
states' insurance departments. The states thereby retained authority to approve the fixing of
insurance rates. See Wiley, Pups, Plants and Package Policies-Or the Insurance Antitrust
Exemption Re-examined, 6 VIL. L. RE. 281, 313-14 (1961).
322 U.S. 533 (1944).
Id. at 539.
An insurance industry publication complained in an editorial:
Insurance D Day fell just a few hours before Eisenhower's D Day ....
[Tihe mental
commotion of insurance men was pitiable, as their attention was torn between invasion
headlines and their efforts to apprehend the consequences of the epochal, adverse U.S.
Supreme Court decision ....
Decisions upon which the whole system of state supervision
of insurance has been founded and under which the business has operated apparently
are juridicial museum pieces.
THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, LIFE INS. ED., June 9, 1944, at 1.
Chief Justice Stone, in his dissent in U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, was
fearful of subjecting the insurance industry to the uncertainties of congressional action. 322
U.S. 533, 562 (1944). Justice Stone pointed out that a number of bills providing for federal
regulation of the insurance industry had been introduced between 1902 and 1908, but the
judiciary committees of the House and Senate concluded that "the regulation of the business
of ... insurance was beyond Congressional power." Id. at 576. See also S. Rep. No. 4406,
59th Cong., 1st Sess. (1906); H. Rep. No. 2491, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-25 (1906).
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burdens on interstate commerce, and tax authorities anticipated a loss of
revenue. 18
In 1945, in reaction to South-Eastern Underwriters, Congress passed
the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 9 This Act clarifies the parameters of permissible federal -regulation and promotes state regulation and taxation of
the "business of insurance." ' 20 The Act does not make the states supreme
in regulating all activities of insurance companies, but only those that
21
constitute the "business of insurance."
The McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed in order to permit state
regulatory mechanisms to function without federal intervention. 22 ' This
purpose is evidenced by the Act's language and its legislative history.
McCarran-Ferguson, however, was not enacted without limitation. It was
never the intent of Congress to give the industry broad license to operate
without antitrust scrutiny. The legislative history of McCarran-Ferguson
expresses the intent of Congress with regard to antitrust immunity:
Nothing in this bill is to be so construed as indicating it to be the
intent or desire of Congress to require or encourage the several States
to enact legislation that would make it compulsory for any insurance
company to become a member of rating bureaus or charge uniform
rates. It is the opinion of Congress that competitive
rates of a sound
23
financial basis are in the public interest.
Further insight into the scope of the antitrust immunity under the
Act was furnished by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who stated that
18. See Kimball & Boyce, supra note 1, at 554.
19. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
20. Id. § 2(a).
21. An operational definition of "business of insurance" is key in determining the scope of the
Act. In S.E.C. v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), Justice Marshall laid down the
following definition:
Congress was concerned with the type of state regulation that centers around the
contract of insurance, the transaction which Paul v. Virginia held was not commerce.
The relationship between insurer and insured; the type of policy which could be issued;
its reliability, interpretaton, and enforcement-these were the core of the business of
insurance .
Id. at 460.
The Supreme Court, however, has recently indicated that it opposes a broad construction
of the "business of insurance" exception to the antitrust laws. Although lower courts had
adopted fairly broad constructions of the statute, the Supreme Court has rendered three recent
decisions that overrule a substantial body of this decisional law.
In two of the decisions, United Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982)
(arrangement whereby a health insurer obtained professional advice from a peer review committee
of a state chiropractic association) and Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug, 440
U.S. 205 (1979) (pharmacy agreements between Blue Shield and participating pharmacies challenged on the ground that the agreements fixed the price of drugs provided to Blue Shield's
policyholders), the Court narrowly construed the phrase "business of insurance" to exclude the
challenged activities of the respective insurers. 458 U.S. at 134; 440 U.S. at 233.
In the third case, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978),
which involved insurer activities that concededly were part of the business of insurance, the
boycott exception to the antitrust exemption was analyzed and expansively interpreted so as to
deny the exemption to the challenged activities of the insurers. Id. at 554.
22. McCarran-Ferguson Act, supra note 2, § 2(b).
23. McCarran-FergusonAct: Hearings on H.R. 143 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2; reprintedin 1945 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 670, 671 [hereinafter
cited as McCarran-FergusonAct Hearings].
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"Congress did not permit private rate fixing, which the Antitrust Act
to permit actual regulation of rates by affirmative
forbids, but was willing
' 24
actions of the States.

It is apparent from the Act's language and legislative history that the
primary purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was to promote state
regulation of the insurance industry. A secondary purpose of the Act,
according to legislative history, was to secure more adequate regulation
of the business of insurance. 25 Given this history, it is doubtful that
Congress intended the Act to affect the insurance industry in the manner
it does today. Both Congress and President Roosevelt seemed to have
acted under the assumption that the states would enact adequate and
effective regulation. In fact, the supplemental role of the federal antitrust
laws seems to imply that Congress considered such laws, at the very least,
as minimum regulatory standards.
Critics argue that the insurance industry today uses private rating
bureaus and displays cartel-like behavior, contrary to congressional intent. 26 Because all the states have enacted regulatory legislation, what
Congress intended to be an implied grant of antitrust immunity actually
functions as an express grant of antitrust immunity. The following section
will focus on the causes of this broad antitrust immunity and the effects
such immunity has on the insurance industry.
CURRENT OPERATION OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
The Adequacy of State Regulation
Critics of state regulation do not believe the insurance industry is
effectively regulated at the state level.2 7 One reason is that Congress, in
passing the Act, failed to enact accompanying standards for judging the
quality of state regulatory efforts. 28 Critics charge that most state insurance
24.

As quoted in ABA SECTION OF INS. LAW PROCEEDINGS 105 (1946).

25.
26.

See McCarran-FergusonAct Hearings, supra note 23, at 672.
As an excerpt from the Congressional Record indicates, it was not the intent of Congress to
abolish rating bureaus. Rather, Congress' intent in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act was to
control anticompetitive activities through adequate and effective state regulation:
Mr. Ferguson: This bill would permit-and I think it fair to say that it is intended to
permit-rating bureaus . .. . [W]e believe that State rights should permit a State to
say that it believes in a rating bureau.

Mr. Pepper: In other words, the Senator believes in a form of rate fixing?
Mr. Ferguson: Yes. There is no doubt the bill allows it; but we believe that all the
wisdom is not here in Congress. We believe that there is some wisdom left in the
legislatures that they should exercise their judgments and regulate insurance, except in
the respects which we have enumerated.
91 CONG. REc. 1481 (1945) (emphasis added).
27. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
28. The interpretation of the proviso in § 2(b) is critical to a determination of what constitutes
sufficient state regulation to preclude application of the antitrust laws. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court has never defined the phrase "to the extent that" in the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. In F.T.C.v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958), the Court held that general state
legislation was not insufficient per se to satisfy the section 2(b) requirement. Id. at 564-65. See
also Anderson, supra note 1, at 99.
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departments do not adequately protect consumers 29 because state insurance
regulatory departments are inadequately staffed and funded.30 Additionally, critics of state regulation contend that state regulatory departments
are ineffective because they have been dominated by "revolving door"
commissioners. 3' Finally, critics of state regulation charge that state reg29.

30.

31.

Commercial purchasers are better able to deal with problems encountered in the insurance
industry than are consumers. When the product liability market tightened in the early 1980s,
Congress enacted the Product Liability Risk Retention Act, Pub. L. No. 97-45, 95 Stat. 949
(1981). Congress was lobbied successfully by commercial purchasers to create risk retention
groups, which allow businesses to band together to purchase commercial liability insurance. The
Risk Retention Act overrides anticompetitive, anti-group state laws for the benefit of commercial
purchasers.
Additionally, rating bureaus have less of an effect on commercial lines of insurance than
on personal lines. From 1980 through late 1983, the Insurance Services Organization, an insurance
rating bureau, suggested certain price changes for commercial lines and personal lines. The
industry adopted rates that were quite different from ISO's recommendations for commercial
lines but tracked ISO closely for personal lines:
ISO Recommended
Companies
Companies Raise
Raised
Difference:
Rates By:
Rates By:
COMMERCIAL LINES
Automobile
+4007o
0%
40%
General Liability
+ 12
-1
27
Multi-peril
+ 30
+ 03
27
PERSONAL LINES
Automobile
+26%
+21%
05076
Homeowners
+26
+24
02
Competition in the Insurance Industry, 1984: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies
and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 387 (1984)
(statement by J. Robert Hunter, President, National Insurance Consumer Organization) [hereinafter cited as Competition Hearings].
This belief is reflected in the following statistics:
-Twenty states have no actuaries on their staffs, making sophisticated review of rate filings
or competitive levels impossible. Actuaries are experts in evaluating the cost of insurance
coverage. They analyze the probability of loss occurrences and arrive at the price that must be
charged to insure against their losses-a price that will enable companies to provide coverage
and make a reasonable profit.
-The amount spent on regulation by the states is five percent of the taxes and fees paid
into the states by insurance companies. Although critics of state regulation have cited the
percentage of premium taxes used for regulation as showing that the states do not commit
sufficient resources to regulation, some insurance commissioners and other advocates of state
regulation charge that this is a meaningless figure because the purpose of premium taxes is to
raise revenue for the state and not to support regulation. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 24.
-On a per-company licensed basis, eleven jurisdictions spend less than $1,000 per company
for all regulation. It is impossible, however, to evaluate the adequacy of insurance regulatory
expenditures based only on the overall budget figures. Budget figures must be viewed in the
context of an overall assessment of state regulation as measured by several criteria, such as state
population, overall state budget and insurance business in the state. Nonetheless, state insurance
department budgets in relation to total state budgets and the amount of insurance business in
the state do show that there are great differences in the amount of available resources that the
states commit to insurance regulation.
-Five states have no examiners. Examiners are responsible for the surveillance of insurance
companies in the areas of financial requirements and trade practices. Competition Hearings,
supra note 29, at 375-76. For a more detailed assessment, see GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at
24-25.
The term "revolving door" applies because insurance regulators are typically chosen from the
insurance industry but then return to it after short terms of service. Under such circumstances,
critics contend that the regulators' points of view may be formed by their industry background,
and their judgment may be shaped by the anticipation that they will be returning to the industry.

See GAO

REPORT,

supra note 4, at 2.
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ulatory departments are ineffective because they protect insurance com-

panies and agents, rather 2than the public, and fail to address major
consumer protection issues.1
Inadequate state regulation raises an additional concern in that immunity from federal antitrust laws enables insurance companies to participate in anticompetitive activities. Insurance companies contend that
antitrust immunity is necessary because of the unique nature of the
insurance business. Critics argue, however, that the immunity allows
insurance companies to engage in anticompetitive activities to the detriment
of the consumer.
Insurers' Use of Anticompetitive Activities

Practices traditionally viewed as anticompetitive, but used extensively
in the insurance industry today, include price fixing agreements, market
allocation agreements and resale price maintenance agreements.
Price Fixing Agreements
The most notorious anticompetitive practice is collective rate setting
through
adopted
bureaus
bureaus

rating bureaus.33 After the passage of McCarran-Ferguson, states
statutes that enabled insurance companies to participate in rating
and pool information concerning risks. These private rating
are still used extensively in the industry. The activities of these

organizations often go beyond the collection of industry loss data.3 4 They
include the averaging of information for specific risk classifications and
the trending of data for past years to predict probable loss expenses for
specified future rate periods. 5 The resulting prices are published as
"bureau rates" for the use of a bureau's members.3 6 Although some
rating bureaus publish only advisory rates, other bureaus operate as cartels.
The National Council on Compensation Insurance, for instance, has rate37
and rule-adherence requirements in its constitution .
32.
33.

Id.
Rating bureaus are more prevalent in the property-liability industry than in the life-health
industry. This is because the information and risk problems faced by life-health insurers are less
severe than in the property-liability industry. In the life-health industry, life expectancy tables
and health data are readily accessible and more predictable for future periods. As a result, lifehealth insurers generally have not engaged in extensive cooperative activities. Life-health insurers
also have not been subject to extensive state rate regulation. See CARTER CoMansasoN REPORT,
supra note 7, at 228, reprinted in Competition Hearings, supra note 29, at 13.
34. Competition Hearings, supra note 29, at 13 (testimony of Hon. Griffin Bell).
35. Id.
36. Illinois, which has no rating law, permits rating bureaus only to collect and compute statistics
based on the loss component of insurance premiums. Consequently, unlike insurers in other
states, each Illinois insurer is responsible for rates that reflect its own expense projections. See
CARTER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 231, reprinted in Competition Hearings, supra
note 29, at 14.
37. The constitution of the National Council on Compensation Insurance states:
Each member shall adhere to all filings made by the National Council on its behalf
with state supervisory authorities, except to the extent that such members shall obtain
the right to depart from such filings in accordance with the requirements of law
specifically applicable thereto or the applicable law precludes, either directly or indirectly,
agreements to adhere....
Competition Hearings, supra note 29, at 382.
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Although rating bureaus were established to enable insurance companies to engage in cooperative operations, insurance companies argue
that the rating bureaus are essential for competitive operations.3 8 The
insurance industry can benefit from the antitrust immunity, they contend,
because it is different than other industries. The insurance industry is
more decentralized and more competitive, and the market share of the
largest company is smaller than in other industries.3 9 The pooling of
information and collective activities, therefore, enables smaller insurance
companies, which otherwise would be too small to determine rates effectively, to compete in the insurance market. 40 This practice is not anticompetitive, they argue, but procompetitive.
Market Allocation Agreements
Another anticompetitive practice tolerated in most states is the use
of market allocation agreements, or horizontal agreements, which are
private, collusive agreements between insurance companies. Market allocation agreements are determinations within the insurance industry of
which companies will operate where. 4 ' These agreements have long been
held to be per se illegal under the antitrust laws because they lack
42
redeeming economic justification.
Resale Price Maintenance Agreements
Resale price maintenance agreements, or vertical price restraints, are
private restraints on competition. Typically called anti-rebate statutes, they
operate on the premise that the retail (agent's) price is set exclusively by
the wholesaler (insurance company). Thus, when an individual buys insurance from a particular insurance company, that individual pays the
same price, no matter which agent the buyer chooses. An efficient agent
cannot compete for market share by reducing his or her commission.
Anti-rebate laws were once called "fair trade" statutes and were
permitted for some years as an exception to the antitrust laws. Congress,

38.

See Brostoff, McCarran-Ferguson Debate Seen Continuing, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER-LIFE
HEAtrH EDITION, May 25, 1985, at 30.
39. See id. See also CARTER ConussroN REPORT, supra note 7, at 229. Characterized by a lack of
significant economies of scale, relatively standardized policies and low barriers to entry, the
property-liability industry appears competitively structured. There are about 2,886 propertyliability insurance companies in the United States, of which the eight largest earned 31.9 percent
of total industry premiums in 1977.
40. See Brostoff, supra note 38, at 30.
41 See Competition Hearings, supra note 29, at 380.
42. The Supreme Court has elaborated on the principle of per se illegality. In construing and
applying the Sherman Act's ban against contracts, conspiracies and combinations in restraint of
trade, the Supreme Court has held that certain agreements or practices are so "plainly anticompetitive" and so often "lack . . . any redeeming virtue" that they are conclusively presumed
illegal without further examination under the rule of reason generally applied in Sherman Act
cases. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-58, nn.27, 28 (1977);
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S., 596, 609 n.10 (1972); Northern Pac. R. Co.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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however, repealed the general authorization for such state laws in 1975. 41
In California Retail Liquor Dealer's Association v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc.,44 the Supreme Court held that state laws authorizing manufacturer
determinations of wholesale and retail prices
for alcoholic beverages were
45
pre-empted under federal antitrust laws.
In the insurance industry, anti-rebate laws are still common. Because
of the insurance industry's market structure, the effect of anti-rebate laws
on the consumer is especially significant. Direct policy writing through
local agents is highly concentrated and enjoys consistently high profits.4
Also, entry into this market is relatively easy. 47 Despite the fact that all
of the elements for a potentially competitive environment exist, anti-rebate
statutes prohibit effective price competition.
Proponents of anti-rebate laws in the insurance industry have characterized the situations that might occur if the anti-rebate laws were
repealed:
It seems quite possible that rebating could foster: (1) unethical
sales practices; (2) gimmickry; (3) misrepresentation; (4) policy replacement; (5) discrimination; (6) payola and kickbacks; (7) less
service by agents; and (8) discounting
for the wealthy at the expense
48
of the average policy purchaser.
As a further example of potential harm, proponents of anti-rebate
statutes point to the situation as it existed before 1908, when rebating
was a national scandal:
Rich people were demanding and getting huge rebates at the
expense of the poor. Union bosses were getting rebates and buying
inferior products at the expense of the workers. Bribes, kickbacks
and rebates had corrupted the buying process to the point where
public confidence in the entire insurance industry was badly shaken. 49
Nonetheless, consumerists challenging the anti-rebate laws won a
recent victory in Florida. In Department of Insurance v. Dade County
Consumer Advocates Office,50 the Florida Supreme Court held that statutes prohibiting insurance agents from accepting commissions lower than
those set by insurers are unconstitutional in that they unnecessarily limit
the bargaining power of the consuming public.5
43.

Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (amending 15 U.S.C.

§§ 1, 45(a) (1982)).
44.
45.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

445 U.S. 97 (1980).
Id. at 105.
See JusTicE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 9.
Id.
See Fogerty, The Case Against Rebating, BEST'S REvIEw: LIFE-HEALTH INSURANCE EDITION,
Aug. 1985, at 32.
Id.
492 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1986).
Id. at 1035. For more than eight years, consumerists in Florida argued that the anti-rebate
provisions were a fair-trade law and against the public interest because discounts were barred.
The Florida insurance department and the life insurance industry were in opposition. In reaching
a decision for the consumer groups, the Florida Supreme Court found "no identifiable relationship between the anti-rebate statutes and a legitimate state purpose in safeguarding the public
health, safety or general welfare." Id. at 1035. The expectation is that the highest court of each
state will be called upon soon to review the same critical issue. See Saks, Florida Finds Anti-
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ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
Insurance companies argue that the antitrust immunity provided by
McCarran-Ferguson is necessary because they could not operate effectively
without the exchange of information provided by the rating bureaus.
Because of recent developments in the law, however, the insurance industry
may not need McCarran-Ferguson's antitrust immunity to exchange such
information. The Supreme Court has held that procompetitive and efficient
collective action, such as sharing past loss data and pooling it to underwrite
5' 2
large risks, will be judged by a "rule of reason."
The major case on the matter is Broadcast Music v. Columbia
Broadcasting System," in which the Supreme Court rejected the claim
that the pooling of thousands of musical compositions for distribution by
a common licensing agency was illegal per se.54 Because the pooling
reduced costs and enabled the composers to reach a broad market, the
arrangement was upheld on remand as legal." Under the same analysis,
if the unique nature of the insurance industry means that collective
activities are necessary to establish competitive costs, then insurance
companies might not need the special grant of immunity to engage in

procompetitive activities .56

rebate Law Unconstitutional-DramaticImpact Expected on Insurance Selling, 13 ESTATE
PLANNING 310 (1986).
52. The "rule of reason" analysis is posited in the provisions of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26
Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1982)).
Under the "rule of reason," the legality of restraints on trade is determined by weighing all
the factors of a case, such as the history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason
for adopting the particular remedy and the purpose or end sought. National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 681-92 (1978).
To constitute a crime under § I of the Sherman Act, a defendant's conduct must result in
an unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce. It is for the jury to determine from a
consideration of all the facts and circumstances, including the economic conditions of the
industry and the effect on competition, whether a defendant's conduct creates an unreasonable
restraint on interstate commerce. The "rule of reason" test is not, however, applied in instances
of per se antitrust violation (e.g. price-fixing). United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S.
392, 400 (1926); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60-68 (1911).
53. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
54. Id. at 24. The Court pointed out what constitutes per se unreasonableness in Northern Pacific
Railway Company v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958):
This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which
are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned,
but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic
investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries,
in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonablean inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
Id. at 5.
55. Columbia Broadcasting System v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980), on remand from sub
nom, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979), cert denied,
450 U.S. 970 (1981).
56. ASCAP involved the use of a blanket license, which was used by licensing agencies to convey
nondramatic performing rights to television networks, and which permitted'the licensee to use
any music in the repertory of the licensor, as often as desired for a one-time license fee. In
deciding that this practice was not a per se violation of the antitrust laws, the Supreme Court
reasoned that:
[because] over the years, and in the face of available alternatives, the blanket license
has provided an acceptable mechanism for at least a large part of the market for the
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The Supreme Court also has elaborated on the proper scope of state
regulation that qualifies for antitrust immunity under the state action
doctrine. 7 The Court has laid down two standards: "First, the challenged
restraint must be one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as
state policy; second, the policy must be actively supervised by the State
itself.""8
Thus, if state statutes authorizing the formation of insurance rating
bureaus are clearly expressed and mandated under state policy, and the
bureaus are actively supervised by the state, then insurance companies
may be immune from antitrust laws without McCarran-Ferguson's grant
of immunity.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The business of insurance historically has been a local activity subject
to state regulation. In enacting McCarran-Ferguson, Congress supported
the policy of state regulation of the insurance industry. Although state
regulation of insurance as a manifestation of federalism is clearly an
important value, it is up to Congress to determine whether the circumstances of insurance regulation continue to be such that the value of
decentralization of governmental authority outweighs other policy goals.5 9

57.

58.
59.

performing rights to copyrighted musical compositions, we cannot agree that it should
automatically be declared illegal inall of its many manifestations. Rather, when attacked,
it should be subjected to a more discriminating examination under the rule of reason.
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added).
Therefore, absent federal antitrust immunity, if a preliminary determination showed that the
collective activities performed by insurance-rating bureaus are acceptable mechanisms for pricing
insurance and not per se violations, then the collective activities would be judged under the
traditional rule of reason.
State action claims arise under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution. Whether an action complained of constitutes state action within the purview of
the fourteenth amendment depends on whether a sufficiently close nexus exists between the state
and the challenged action so that the action may fairly be treated as that of the state itself.
The concept of state action with reference to antitrust immunity was first laid down in Parker
v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
California Retail Liquor Dealer's Ass'n v. Midcal, 445 U.S. 105 (1980).
A government report dealing with the insurance issue has outlined circumstances in which the
government has been forced to intervene and regulate a given market:
Although the United States is basically a free market economy, the government intervenes
when a particular market does not function efficiently or when the market produces undesirable
consequences for society.
Flaws in the marketplace that require regulatory intervention are known as market failures.
Examples of market failures are:
-Natural monopolies wherein the production of a commodity is characterized by substantial
economies of scale. The largest firm in the industry is the most efficient and has the ability to
underprice competing firms and drive them out of business. The surviving firm becomes a
monopolist who tends to reduce output, raise prices and make excess profits.
-Destructive competition, which exists when destabilizing price wars render an industry
incapable of satisfying consumer demand. Prices and product availability fluctuate widely,
sustained losses are incurred by firms, and wants go unsatisfied. Consumers and producers are
injured.
-Inadequate information in the marketplace, which prevents the best functioning of the
market and results in poor decisions and wasted resources.
See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 9-10.
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In the past, various proposals for reforming McCarran-Ferguson and
subjecting the insurance industry to federal antitrust laws have been
advanced.w0 If such measures of reform were to materialize, however, the
system of dual regulation of the insurance industry that would inevitably
6
develop certainly would lead to even greater confusion. '
Therefore, reform must take place in state legislatures. State regulation of the insurance industry enables local citizenry to assess their own
needs and form suitable responses and permits state-by-state experimen-

tation. Further, state regulatory systems already exist in all fifty states.
Although insurance companies complain that it is inefficient to comply
with the regulatory requirements of fifty different state insurance departments, an alternative scheme of federal regulation would have to be
developed. To combat differing state regulatory requirements, better uniformity in state regulatory laws should continue 62to be pursued by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
CONCLUSION
With the widespread publicity of the liability crisis in the insurance
industry, it is probably unrealistic to believe that Congress will continue
to support existing policies of state regulation of insurance. But even
though amendment or repeal of McCarran-Ferguson is possible, state
lawmakers still should strive to reform state regulatory departments in an
effort to make the departments more responsive to the needs of consumers.
60. See, e.g., supra note 10 and accompanying text. See also Comment, Risky Business: Consumer
Protection in the Insurance Industry, 23 H~Av. J. LEGIS. 287, 298 (1986) (advocating enactment
of a National Insurance Consumer Organization proposal for federal oversight of the insurance
industry); Nedrow, The McCarran Controversy: Insurance and the Antitrust Law, 12 CONN. L.
Ray. 205, 263 (1980) (suggesting a model amendment to the McCarran-Ferguson Act that would
allow insurers to elect regulation under either a state or federal scheme).
61. Compare the complexity of regulatory legislation in the banking industry. The regulatory structure
in which banks operate starts with the Comptroller of the Currency, who serves as the primary
bank supervisor for the nation's national banks; the Federal Reserve Board, which is the primary
bank supervisor for the state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System;
and the FDIC, which serves as the primary federal bank supervisor for the state banks that are
not members of the Federal Reserve System.
Paralleling this federal regulatory structure is a state banking supervisory structure. Additionally, Congress has created other federal agencies. One, the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council, seeks to obtain greater uniformity in administration of the Federal Reserve
Board, the FDIC and the Comptroller. Another, the Depository Institutions Deregulation
Committee, was created to deregulate interest rates. See Homogenization of FinancialInstitutions:
The Legislative and Regulatory Response 38 Bus. LAW. 241, 244-45 (1982).
62. The NAIC consists of the heads of the insurance departments of the 50 states, the District of
Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. NAIC's basic purpose is to provide
necessary uniformity, cooperation and expertise to the various states and territories as they
individually regulate the insurance business. Although the NAIC has no legal regulatory authority,
it is an inherent and significant part of the system by which the insurance business is regulated.
The primary functions of the NAIC are to:
-draft model laws and regulations for voluntary adoption of the states:
-gather and distribute information on regulatory matters, such as license revocations and
securities valuations;
-maintain computerized financial data aimed at early detection of insurer insolvency; and
-conduct studies of nationally significant insurance issues.
GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 173-74.
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Ideally, before pursuing any course of action, Congress should study
existing state schemes of insurance regulation for positive and negative
feedback to aid in developing future regulatory reform. A further ideal
would be that, in the near future, the states would have more positive
than negative feedback to offer.
Jeffrey L. Schrader*
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